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Abstract
Over recent decades there has been a growing interest in the question of whether
computer programs are capable of genuinely creative activity. Although this notion
can be explored as a purely philosophical debate, an alternative perspective is to
consider what aspects of the behaviour of a program might be noted or measured in
order to arrive at an empirically supported judgement that creativity has occurred.
We sketch out, in general abstract terms, what goes on when a potentially creative
program is constructed and run, and list some of the relationships (for example,
between input and output) which might contribute to a decision about creativity.
Specifically, we list a number of criteria which might indicate interesting properties
of a program’s behaviour, from the perspective of possible creativity. We go on to
review some ways in which these criteria have been applied to actual implementa-
tions, and some possible improvements to this way of assessing creativity.
Keywords: AI methodology • Computational creativity • Empirical criteria •
Generating artefacts • Assessing output.
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Introduction
Since the early days of artificial intelligence, there has been a dispute about the fun-
damental limitations of computer programs in the general area of imitating human
activities (Dreyfus 1979; Weizenbaum 1976). Boden (1992) attributes some of the cen-
tral questions in this debate to the 19th century pioneer Ada Lovelace. One aspect of
computer behaviour which is particularly contentious is that of creativity, summarised
by the general philosophical question : “can computers be truly creative?”. Recent
decades have seen a growth in attempts to build computer programs which tackle tasks
which, when performed by humans, are deemed creative: representational paintings
(Boden 1992: pp. 135-153), music (Baggi 1992; Miranda 2001), mathematical concepts
(Lenat 1979; Colton 2002), stories (Meehan 1976; Turner 1994), jokes (Binsted and
Ritchie 1997; Stock and Strapparava 2005), or poems (Gerva´s 2000, 2001, 2002; Manu-
rung et al. 2000b,a). As well as all this concrete work in specific domains of creativity,
there has also been a stream of work which tries to pin down the formal properties of
(computational) creative processes in a domain-independent manner (Wiggins 2001,
2003, 2005, 2006a,b; Pease et al. 2001). Within that, a recurring theme is the question
“which computational mechanisms are most suited to producing creative behaviour?”.
This strand has been heavily influenced by the much-debated ideas of Boden (1992,
1998) on the nature of creativity.
The proposals here fall, to some extent, between these two streams (specific imple-
mentations and general analyses), and may even be seen as trying to bridge between
them. Our objective is to set out a way in which very general questions such as the
philosophical “can computers be truly creative?”, and the more practical “which com-
putational mechanisms are most suited to producing creative behaviour?”, can be con-
nected to empirical evidence from actual working systems. The reasoning is that such
general questions can be answered only if we have a way of answering the more spe-
cific question “has this program behaved creatively on this occasion?” (or perhaps “to
what extent has this program behaved creatively on this occasion?”). Without a way to
answer this question, the more general questions can never be tested empirically. We
take it as a general axiom of scientific methodology that claims should be subject to
empirical refutation or corroboration.
It may be helpful to point out some issues which will not be tackled here. Firstly,
we are not attempting to characterise the nature of the creative process, nor to build
a model of creativity (unlike Wiggins (2001, 2006a,b), for example). This means that
many of the suggestions raised by Boden (1992), and debated subsequently, about dif-
ferent types of creativity (combinational, exploratory, transformational) are not under
consideration here. Also, the present paper is not itself empirical, but methodological:
we are considering where one might look for evidence, rather than offering actual evi-
dence of creativity for any particular programs. We will not be attempting to support
or refute the proposition that computers can be creative, but will be considering how it
would be possible to substantiate or refute such hypotheses empirically. However, this
does not mean that we will be discussing such experimental matters as testing proce-
dure, construction of suitable controls, use of appropriate statistics, etc. Although these
are important issues, a logically prior debate is the decision about what factors are to be
observed, and how these might relate to creativity. Once we have some idea of what to
measure, then standard experimental practices can be adopted.
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We shall start by setting down our basic methodological assumptions. Then we
shall present our main proposals, starting with an abstract characterisation of the situ-
ation in which a potentially creative program is built and run, and proceeding to argue
for various possible factors which might be relevant to a judgement about the creativity
of the program. These factors will be formally stated as criteria which can be applied
precisely, providing that the relevant information about the program is available. After
listing these criteria, we shall look briefly at some related work which has developed
since the criteria first appeared (Ritchie 2001), and then review some small studies
where the criteria were applied to actual systems. After reflecting on the lessons of
these studies, and we speculate on possible extensions to the framework.
Assumptions
What Kinds of Activity are Creative?
The use of the term “creative” originated within human society, and our whole no-
tion of “creative” tends to manifest various social and cultural prejudices which have
to be taken into consideration when considering computer behaviour. In this author’s
culture at least, certain activities are assumed to be more creative than others. Painting
a picture, writing a poem, or creating a sculpture are often deemed creative, even when
performed in a relatively ordinary manner. Mathematics, science, or engineering are
rarely classed as creative, unless they are done exceptionally well. This bias does not
seem helpful in a rigorous attempt to pin down the notion of creativity, particularly
when applied to machines. Although there is still a tendency within AI to tacitly ac-
cept this intellectual apartheid of creative vs. non-creative activities, it would be better
if we could be more neutral in our formal characterisation of creative actions. In the
rest of this paper, the illustrative domains mentioned will typically be areas such as
poetry-writing or story-telling, but this does not mean that the formal definitions or
substantive proposals relate only to those activities. We will abstract away from the
particular genre of activity, and discuss only the formal properties of the production of
artefacts. (See later in this section for a more detailed sketch of the type of programs
considered.)
The Basis in Human Creativity
A central assumption here is that any formal definition of creativity must be based
on its ordinary usage; that is, it must be natural and it must be based on human behaviour.
(This is probably tacitly assumed by most research in this area, but is worth making
explicit, to give later discussion a firmer foundation.) By “natural”, we mean that any
technical definition of “creative” (or “creativity”) which is to be used in discussing the
behaviour of computer programs must capture fairly accurately the original ordinary
language use of the term. This is the only way to ensure that we are at least broadly
considering creativity, and not some other concept, and that any claims or findings
can be expressed in a meaningful way. Despite the fact that ordinary language is of-
ten imprecise or ambiguous and scientific usage should be exact, our precise formal
definition should be a close approximation of the original loose term.
4 G. Ritchie
Similarly, the “basis in human behaviour” means that we should be guided by the
way that the word “creative” is ordinarily used when talking of non-machine (human)
creativity, for two reasons. Firstly, this provides us with some guidelines in firming up
what we mean by creativity. Secondly, to rely on instances of machine creativity (the
problem we wish to analyse) would risk circularity in claims about the nature of that
process.
This orientation explains the allusions, in later sections, to instances of human cre-
ativity (as is commonplace in articles in this area).
Sources of Evidence
We should, in our pursuit of evidence that a program has behaved creatively, con-
sider only empirically observable factors. In human creative activities, there are certain
aspects which are knowable, such as the attributes of the artefact created, the other
comparable artefacts in existence, possibly the other artefacts the creating individual
was aware of. What we usually do not know is the mental or emotional processes by
which the individual produced the artefact (although we may know other aspects of
the action, such as the time taken). Hence, it is routine to make judgements of cre-
ativity (in humans) on the basis of what is known, often focussing on the attributes of
the artefact(s). If our formal definition of achieving creativity, for analysis of computer
systems, is to mimic our judgements of humans, then it too should be based only on
comparably observable factors, without adding extra information about the internal
workings of the computer program. This may be our most contentious working as-
sumption, as some would argue that the inner workings of a computer program are
critical in deciding its creativity; in particular, (Boden 1992: pp.39-40) advocates just
such consideration of the underlying process (for both humans and computers). We
suggest that this would move away from the way human creativity is normally judged.
(It also risks circularity when asking the question “which computational mechanisms
give rise to creativity?” — see below.)
There is a fine but important distinction between the production of the artefact,
and the devising of the production-method; if we happen to know the method, we can
treat it as an abstract artefact and consider the creativity it manifests, relative to other
production-methods. This holds true for both computer and human creativity, to some
extent, and starts to address the intuition that human artefacts might be assessed in
terms of how much technical skill went into their production, as sometimes happens
in critiques of “conceptual” art. For example, suppose a human artist devises a highly
original way of producing some physical artefact, such as a multi-media installation
or a sculpture, and then employs skilled technicians to implement this method. The
artist’s contribution is the invention of the method (an abstract artefact), and we can
assess this achievement (for its creativity, etc.). The characteristics of the final concrete
result may be more attributable to the implementers.
The more finely one wishes to model judgements of creativity, the more complex
matters become. For the purposes of setting up an initial framework, we shall adopt
the (possibly over-simplified) assumption that the internal workings of a program are
not part of the relevant data.
All this is directed at ensuring that our definition is genuinely empirical, and stated
in terms of factors which are (at least in principle) observable. Moreover, our defini-
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tion(s) should describe what behaviour we would regard as creative without building
in, prematurely, proposals about how that behaviour might be achieved. If we can
maintain a separation between our observational vocabulary and our theoretical mod-
els of possible mechanisms, then we can, without circularity, treat questions such as
“which computational mechanisms lead to creativity?” as empirical issues. If we in-
corporate our hunches about the best way to achieve creativity into our definitions
of what observable behaviour constitutes creativity, then we have, to a large extent,
undermined the empirical nature of the investigation.
Colton (personal communication) has suggested that if a program run produces a
set of output items which is highly-rated (by whatever measures are appropriate —
see later in this section) in a relatively simple manner, it should be regarded as more
creative than a comparable program run which is more laborious in producing the
same results. It is unclear what importance could be attached to such information. Is it
only to be used as a “tie-breaker” when two different programs produce equally good
results? If not, how is it to be weighed up against the ratings of the created artefacts? It
is argued in Ritchie (2006: Section 7.5) that if we define a particular program behaviour
(being “transformational”) as constituting creativity, then there is a potential dilemma
if there is a mismatch between the implications of a program’s internal and external
behaviours: what if a program’s transformational status supplies evidence contrary to
that from the relevant attributes of its output? A similar issue has to be considered
here: even if we formalise some notion of the way in which a computation has been
achieved, how should we use that information, without pre-judging the issue of what
computations are most effective in achieving creativity?
What Kind of Program?
We will be putting forward an analysis of what goes on when a program carries out
potentially “creative” activity. The raises the questions: what types of program are we
considering, and can we define this class of program without first defining “creative”,
which might run the risk of circularity?
The broad class of program under consideration operates in the following situation:
• There is some (usually culturally-defined) class of artefacts which the program is
to generate. This class of artefacts exists prior to the program being constructed,
and is not defined in terms of the workings of the program.
• The class is, in principle, extremely large, possibly infinite.
• Given an item (human or computer generated), there may not be a precise defi-
nition of whether it is in that class. That is, membership of the class is ill-defined
in some way, being either fuzzy, or subjective, or not subject to algorithmic as-
sessment. Moreover, humans are able to judge (possibly with disagreements) the
extent to which an artefact belongs to a particular class.
• Given an item, humans can rate the (usually subjective) “quality” of the item.
These attributes are intended to capture what it is that computer-generated poems,
artistic pictures, stories, etc. have in common, and to distinguish them from more or-
derly constructs such as solutions to equations, the results of numerical calculations,
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the output of a compiler, or the documents found by an information retrieval system. It
is noticeable that the devising of mathematical concepts or conjectures is, historically,
regarded within AI as being (potentially) creative (Lenat 1976; Colton 2002), even
though such objects are more well-defined than poems or paintings. (Colton (personal
communication) has pointed out that the HR program (Steel et al. 2000; Colton et al.
2000) produces only well-formed items of the target class, namely mathematical con-
jectures.) However, in all other respects they conform to the sketch given above. This
means that one could choose to apply our framework to mathematical discovery pro-
grams, but would find that some parts of it gave trivial or uninteresting results. (See
also (Ritchie 2006: Section 4.2) for further discussion.)
Given the essential reliance on human judgement to assess the output of a program,
we should make explicit that we have in mind an arrangement whereby a computer
program produces items of some sort, and these are appraised (in some suitably con-
trolled way) by human judges. This puts the computer program on the same level, and
makes it subject to similar standards, as human creators.
P-creativity and H-creativity
Boden (1992) makes the important distinction between H-creativity (producing an
idea/artefact which is wholly novel within the culture, not just new to its creator)
and P-creativity (producing an idea/artefact which is original as far as the creator is
concerned, even though it might have been proposed or generated elsewhere in the
culture, perhaps much earlier in history). This is a very useful distinction, because
it clarifies what evidence is or is not relevant. Boden points out that when studying
the process of being creative (within a single human or in a computer program) it is
P-creativity that is at issue, since we are interested in how a single agent can come
up with something that is novel relative to its initial state of knowledge. A P-creative
discovery may prove to be of little use to society because it repeats something that was
already known, but that does not render the intellectual or artistic feat of producing
the idea/artefact uncreative, viewed in isolation. The mechanisms of creation are what
we are interested in here; that is, we shall largely ignore the H (historical) variant, and
consider only the P (personal) notion of creativity.
Essential Properties
In discussions of creativity, there seems to be widespread support for the idea that
two important, perhaps essential, criteria for deciding whether creativity has occurred
are:
Novelty: To what extent is the produced item dissimilar to existing examples of
its genre?
Quality: To what extent is the produced item a high quality example of its genre?
As noted earlier, discussions of creativity have to be rooted in human creativity,
where assessments of the novelty or quality of an artefact are assumed to be applied
only to genuine examples of the artefact class (stories, melodies, poems, pictures, etc.).
That is, philosophical discussions of creativity (typified by Boden) usually do not con-
sider the prior test:
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Typicality: To what extent is the produced item an example of the artefact class in
question?
Since computer creativity is at a relatively basic stage, this more prosaic question has
to be asked of items before appreciation of novelty and quality arise. (Novelty and typ-
icality may well be related, since high novelty may raise questions about, or suggest a
low value for, typicality; we shall return to this matter later.) For example, poetry gen-
erators are currently incapable of reliably producing texts which would consistently be
rated as poems by human judges, and joke generators are similarly variable in quality.
It therefore makes sense to consider the most fundamental goal of a potentially creative
program: is it even doing the job it is supposed to do, by producing artefacts which are
of the required sort?
In our formulation below, we have chosen to make typicality and quality prim-
itive elements, describing the (very important) concept of novelty in terms of other
constructs, including typicality. The intention is that both typicality and quality will
usually be assessed by human judgement, and may therefore be partly or wholly sub-
jective.
Judgements by humans will be based on their whole cultural experience and knowl-
edge, and hence are likely to reflect historical comparisons of the artefacts. It might
seem that this means human verdicts can assess only H-creativity, not P-creativity.
However, if we avoid using human judgements about concepts such as “originality”,
“novelty” or “creativity”, and instead try to confine these verdicts to more basic no-
tions such as typicality and quality, we may be able to keep the focus on P-creativity.
Novelty will be taken into account elsewhere in our framework, not treated as a prim-
itive judgement.
In passing, one could consider that the difference between P-creativity and H-
creativity (‘ P-creativity and H-creativity’ above) is primarily definable in terms of
novelty — an achievement which is P-creative but not H-creative may meet similar
standards of quality, but not be greatly novel when judged in a wider context. More
specifically, the difference lies in the source or basis of the novelty judgement: the in-
dividual, or a whole culture through history. In a sense, there are analogous notions
of P-novel and H-novel, which play corresponding roles in defining P-creative and
H-creative. We shall refer back to this when discussing Koza et al.’s proposals.
The Framework
In the next section, we shall set out our central idea: a set of criteria which can be
applied to a situation where a (potentially creative) program has created some output
data (artefacts), and which give some indicators of the extent to which that program
has been creative on that occasion. Before we can state the criteria precisely, we need
to outline, at a suitable level of abstraction, exactly the type of situation to which our
criteria apply. That is, we need a formal statement of the entities and relations that
are involved when a program “creates”, so we can set up conditions whose fulfilment
might count as evidence of creativity. That formal statement is the topic of this section.
Basic Items
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A creating program operates to produce artefacts in some medium. The “medium”
is essentially the output data type of the program. At the level of abstraction adopted
here, we can ignore (at least provisionally — see ‘Possible Extensions’ below) the in-
ternal structure of the entities that the program produces, and simply postulate a set,
possibly infinite, of basic items. This is not a definition of what would count as a “suc-
cessful” or “valid” output for the program, merely a statement of the data type which
it produces (e.g. strings of words, arrays of pixels). For example, the basic item set for
a program intended to produce simple verbal jokes might be the set of finite sequences
of words and punctuation symbols.
Rating the Output
We want any assessment of items produced by a program to be as faithful as possi-
ble to the two notions of novelty and quality stated in the previous section, taking into
account the remarks we made about typicality.
We shall take basic items as being possible instances of the intended class of artefacts.
More subtly, they may be instances to some degree. We will therefore represent a
class of artefacts (the target of the creative exercise) as a mapping from the basic items
to the interval [0, 1]. (This is equivalent to treating the class as a fuzzy set, but that
perspective will not be developed here.) That is, the extent to which an output basic
item is a poem/story/picture/joke/melody/etc. will be expressed as this numeric
score. This is the notion of typicality introduced in the previous section, and takes
one step towards allowing us to capture the novelty criterion. We will decompose
the intuitive idea of novelty into two separate factors. Firstly, items which gain low
scores on the typicality mapping will be deemed to be dissimilar to the norm for that
class. That is, we assume that this mapping encodes the notion of established norms
for the artefact class, so that high-scoring items are very much part of the class, and
low-scoring ones are implicitly dissimilar from the past practice (in society or culture)
which has established the class. This gives an abstract notion of novelty with respect
to the genre. Secondly, in the next section, we shall try to formalise the notion of a
program producing items which are different from those which guided its original
construction. This is a more local, specific form of novelty with respect to a subset
of already known artefacts. In this way, we do not treat novelty as a single primitive
attribute, but decompose it (slightly) into other factors, which could be loosely glossed
as untypicality and innovation.
As noted earlier, a useful distinction can be made between properties which mea-
sure to what extent an item meets the criteria for membership in the intended artefact
class (is it a poem/joke/conjecture/etc.?) and further properties whose presence indi-
cate that the artefact is a good instance of this type of artefact (a good poem, a funny
joke, an elegant or profound conjecture, etc.). This latter evaluation will also be for-
malised as a mapping from basic items to [0, 1]. This attempts to capture the second
informal property, quality, introduced earlier.
Both typicality and quality would normally be determined by human assessment
of basic items (potential artefacts). For example, the output of the JAPE joke-generator
was evaluated by human judges against two standards: “is this item a joke?” and “how
funny is this item?” (Binsted et al. 1997). These correspond directly to the typicality
rating and the value rating of our framework, so (given the complete raw data from
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that evaluation) these criteria could be evaluated.
These two mappings — for class membership and quality — may themselves be
based on further definitions (e.g. a checklist of properties, perhaps with weightings
attached). At present, we have no firm proposals on what this information should be,
but we shall call it a rating scheme, and list it separately so that the distinction can be
made in our later definitions, abstracting away from its internal details. We shall also
assume an operation APPLY which, given a rating scheme, creates a mapping to [0, 1].
Notationally, we shall usually make the abbreviation of using the name of a rating
scheme as if it were the function which APPLY would create; that is, writing rat(X)
as short for APPLY(rat)(X). The set of possible rating schemes for a set A will be
written as “RAT (A)”.
The Objects Generated
We can now use a rating scheme as representing a class of basic items.
Definition 1
An artefact class consists of a set B of basic items and a rating scheme for B.
Here we are using a single rating scheme to capture both inherent, measurable
properties of a basic item, such as syllable counts, and more subjective aspects. In par-
ticular, discussions of creativity sometimes argue that the expectations of the audience
are relevant — an artefact which exceeds or violates the expectations of the perceiver
may be rated more highly. Here, those aspects are packed into the notion of an arte-
fact class, on the grounds that expectations are in a sense a subjective notion of what
typifies a particular genre. This should suffice at least as a first approximation.
As noted above, we also need a rating scheme to represent the quality of the gener-
ated artefact.
Definition 2
A value-based artefact class consists of a triple (B, typ, val), where B is a set (the basic
items) and typ, val ∈ RAT (B) (the typicality ratings and the value ratings respectively).
Inspiring Set, Program and Results
The origins of a generating program are pertinent to assessing its creativity, as is
often acknowledged by worries about “results being pre-programmed in”. However,
it is beyond the scope of this paper to formalise this part of the process. For the mo-
ment, we shall adopt a very simplified framework, as follows. The construction of the
program is influenced (either explicitly or implicitly) by some subset of the available
basic items. This subset, which we will call the inspiring set, could be all the rele-
vant artefacts known to the program designer, or items which the program is designed
to replicate, or a knowledge base of known examples which drives the computation
within the program.
The motivation for including the inspiring set (notated I) in our formal account is
that creativity could be viewed as depending on the extent to which the program does
or does not replicate (or closely imitate) the instances which guided its design.
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Where I consists of a wide variety of examples with which the program designer
was acquainted, it may be very difficult to define its exact extent, so that some of our
formal proposals involving this set will be hard to apply in practice. However, some of
the studies we shall discuss later show how I may be a concrete set of instances which
drive the creating program’s computations.
It has been suggested (by a reviewer of this paper) that it is also necessary to con-
sider the case where there is no inspiring set. This is different from the analyst not
knowing what inspiring set had been involved, or the results being completely dif-
ferent from the inspiring set; this condition involves there being no such items at all
(I = ∅). For there to be no inspiring set, a program (of the general sort outlined in
‘Assumptions’) would have to come into being without the designer being guided by
any exemplars of the artefacts to be created, and with no (semi-)automated process
(e.g. machine learning, case-based reasoning) which was based on exemplars. Perhaps
this could be the case where a program was designed to create what we have called
“basic items”, possibly randomly, with no previous choice of artefact class. In such a
situation, it is conceivable that a program creating random strings of words and punc-
tuation might happen to produce a poem or a story. This is not typical of the situations
focussed on here; however, our formalisation does allow for an empty inspiring set as
a special case.
As noted above, we will not offer a dissection of how a (potentially creative) pro-
gram comes into being. For example, the relationship of the inspiring set to the program
is of interest. The program design/construction could be human-crafted or automated;
parts of the process could even be random. There is also the question of input param-
eters used for different runs of a program. The creativity of the program could in
principle be assessed according to these aspects. As our proposals constitute an initial
framework, we have confined our attention to a narrower range of phenomena, and
have not attempted to describe these possibilities within our criteria (but see ‘Possible
Extensions’, later). For our purposes, a program produces a set of basic items, R.
Evidence for Creativity
Preliminaries
The various formal constructs set out above allow us to state some criteria which
could be applied in deciding how successful a potentially creative program is, or has
been, in a particular run. We do not consider the idea that the creativity of a program
can be considering independently of the sets of results that it produces, i.e. the outputs
from its runs. We do not claim that all these criteria are essential to an assessment of
creativity, nor that they are the only such criteria that could be considered; rather, they
are a first draft of a general catalogue of relevant factors (see ‘Discussion’, later).
These criteria tackle the question of appraising the output of a generating program
in isolation, without knowledge of the program’s construction or internal workings.
This is comparable to the assessment which people routinely make of human-created
artefacts (see ‘Assumptions’ above).
In the formal criteria listed below, we assume a value-based artefact class (B, typ, val),
an inspiring set I (a subset of B), and a program which has produced a set of results R
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(also a subset of B). That is, our criteria apply to the results of a particular run of the
program, or of a set of runs where the results have been aggregated without maintain-
ing links to the runs which created them.
It should be possible to generalise these ideas to cover a sequence of “runs” where a
sequence of separate result sets is produced, so as to assess the creativity of a program
in general rather than a single run of that program. That elaboration is not explored
here (but see ‘Possible Extensions’ below).
The criteria involve the ratings typ and val, the result set (R) and the inspiring set
(I), combined and compared in various ways.
For convenience, we employ the following notation:
Tα,β(X)
def
= {x ∈ X | α ≤ typ(x) ≤ β}: The subset of X falling in a given range of typ-
icality.
Vα,β(X)
def
= {x ∈ X | α ≤ val(x) ≤ β}: The subset of X falling in a given range of qual-
ity.
AV (F,X)
def
=
∑
x∈X F (x)
|X| : The average value of a function F across finite set X .
ratio(X,Y )
def
= |X||Y | : The relative sizes of two finite sets X,Y , where Y 6= ∅.
The Criteria
As noted earlier when we introduced the notion of typicality, the first goal which a
potentially creative computer program must meet, before aspiring to novelty or qual-
ity, is to produce items which are judged as being instances of the intended class. This
factor is represented here by the typ scores of result items, so one way to capture the
success of the program on this rudimentary goal would be to look at the average value
of this score across the result set (notation as defined above):
Criterion 1 AV (typ,R) > θ, for suitable θ.
Here, θ is some threshold to be chosen in the particular situation, indicating the
score at which items are deemed to have reached acceptable typicality. It is not obvious
or trivial to define such a threshold. We shall return to this matter in ‘Discussion’
below.
Still focussing on this elementary notion of success, another possible condition to
examine is whether a significant proportion of the result set are indeed examples of the
intended genre, by scoring well on typicality:
Criterion 2 ratio(Tα,1(R), R) > θ, for suitable α, θ.
In this criterion, there are two parameters to be chosen, α and θ. The expression
Tα,1(R) can be thought of as “created artefacts which conform to the established defi-
nition of, or norms for, the class”.
These two criteria can be seen as conflicting with the novelty requirement, but,
as discussed in ‘Assumptions’, merely succeeding in conforming to the norms of the
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chosen genre is an achievement for a computer program. It is therefore worthwhile
including some tests for this level of success. Branching out into producing untypical
items — as suggested by novelty — is a more advanced level of creativity, which we
will attempt to capture in further criteria, below.
When we widen the scope of the assessment to consider quality (i.e. are the gen-
erated artefacts rated as being good, in some sense?), then there are two analogous
criteria to the above typicality conditions — average quality being above some thresh-
old, and a large proportion of the results being above some quality threshold, with
Vγ,1(R) meaning “the high-quality artefacts”:
Criterion 3 AV (val, R) > θ, for suitable θ.
Criterion 4 ratio(Vγ,1(R), R) > θ, for suitable γ, θ.
A more subtle criterion would be to confine attention to those items which met
some typicality threshold (i.e. were genuine instances of the artefact class) and then
ask what proportion of these also scored well in terms of quality:
Criterion 5 ratio(Vγ,1(R) ∩ Tα,1(R), Tα,1(R)) > θ, for suitable α, γ, θ.
As Boden (1992) makes clear, a higher rating of creativity should be accorded to the
production of artefacts which do not conform closely to the norms of the genre (typi-
cality), but which nevertheless are rated highly when judged on their merits (quality).
We can model this judgement in various ways, depending on what we choose to com-
pare the set of untypical high-valued items (Vγ,1(R) ∩ T0,β(R)) with. One possibility
would be to compare with the entire set of outputs (R):
Criterion 6 ratio(Vγ,1(R) ∩ T0,β(R), R) > θ, for suitable β, γ, θ.
This criterion asks whether a large proportion of the program’s output falls into the
(supposedly desirable) category of untypical but high-valued. Alternatively, we could
compare with the set of all untypical items (T0,β(R)):
Criterion 7 ratio(Vγ,1(R) ∩ T0,β(R), T0,β(R)) > θ, for suitable β, γ, θ.
That is, what proportion of the untypical items are of good quality? If there are no
untypical items, (i.e. T0,β(R) = ∅ for whatever value of β is deemed appropriate), then
this criterion could not be used.
A comparison could also be made with the set of typical high-valued items (Vγ,1(R)∩
Tα,1(R)):
Criterion 8 ratio(Vγ,1(R) ∩ T0,β(R), Vγ,1(R) ∩ Tα,1(R)) > θ, for suitable α, β, γ, θ.
This criterion, as originally stated in Ritchie (2001), has certain formal flaws. Firstly,
unlike most of the other criteria, the left hand side value does not range between 0 and
1, but is unbounded. Secondly, in cases where there are no high-value highly typical
values (Vγ,1(R) ∩ Tα,1(R) is empty), the ratio involves division by zero. The revised
version below avoids these undesirable properties, but makes a slightly different com-
parison — high-value untypical items and all high-value items:
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Criterion 8a ratio(Vγ,1(R) ∩ T0,β(R), Vγ,1(R)) > θ, for suitable α, β, γ, θ.
We have now introduced all the threshold parameters which will be used in these
criteria: α (threshold to achieve high typicality), β (limit of untypicality), γ (threshold
to achieve good quality), and θ (general comparison level in all criteria).
Now we turn to another aspect of novelty, namely the extent to which the program
reproduces known examples. Earlier, we proposed criteria 1 and 2 to allow considera-
tion of a lower level of attainment than is sometimes considered in more philosophical
discussions. Similarly, it is useful to consider a way of defining “mere replication”,
as this may, particularly in the earlier stages of development of a program, be a use-
ful goal to achieve. Ritchie and Hanna (1984) comment that even if the AM program
(Lenat 1976) had not produced anything original, but had “merely” shown a com-
putational route by which many interesting (known) concepts could in principle be
reached, that would have been a useful finding. The next criterion formalises that idea
— replicating a large proportion of the inspiring set I :
Criterion 9 ratio(I ∩R, I) > θ for suitable θ.
However, there is general agreement that producing more than just the inspiring
set is a symptom of creativity, and this can be described by considering the ratio of the
whole result set to the subset which are replications:
Criterion 10 ratio(R, I ∩R) > θ, for suitable θ.
This is another criterion whose original statement (Ritchie 2001) has formal flaws.
Its left hand side value does not range between 0 and 1, and, in cases where there are
no replicated values (I ∩ R is empty), the ratio involves division by zero. A revised
version could be formed by inverting the ratio, but this would lead to a criterion with
“less than” as its central operator, inelegantly different from the other criteria. A better
revision is the following:
Criterion 10a (1− ratio(I ∩R,R)) > θ, for suitable θ.
Let us turn now to novel results (i.e. items not in the inspiring set): R − I . Simply
producing unknown items is not interesting unless they have some significant proper-
ties. Firstly, they could, on average, be exemplars of the chosen genre:
Criterion 11 AV (typ, (R− I)) > θ, for suitable θ.
Another possible success condition would be that novel items were, on average,
highly valued:
Criterion 12 AV (val, (R− I)) > θ, for suitable θ.
To be more demanding, we could ask whether novel and highly typical items form
a significant proportion of the results:
Criterion 13 ratio(Tα,1(R− I), R) > θ, for suitable α, θ.
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Similarly, we could ask if novel and high quality items are a high proportion of the
results:
Criterion 14 ratio(Vγ,1(R− I), R) > θ, for suitable γ, θ.
The above are the only criteria originally presented in Ritchie (2001), but there are
a few more which suggest themselves on the basis of the last few in the list. We could
similarly consider whether highly typical items formed a high proportion of the novel
items:
Criterion 15 ratio(Tα,1(R− I), (R− I)) > θ, for suitable α, θ.
Similarly, the proportion of high-valued items amongst the novel items could be
considered:
Criterion 16 ratio(Vγ,1(R− I), (R− I)) > θ, for suitable γ, θ.
The last two conditions to consider are the occurrence within the novel results of
items which are of good quality and highly typical (i.e. demonstrate creativity within
existing norms) or are of good quality and untypical (i.e. demonstrate some original
deviation from past practice):
Criterion 17 ratio(Vγ,1(R− I) ∩ Tα,1(R− I)), (R− I)) > θ, for suitable α, γ, θ.
Criterion 18 ratio(Vγ,1(R− I) ∩ T0,β(R− I), (R− I)) > θ, for suitable β, γ, θ.
All of criteria 11 to 18 would be inapplicable in the case where (R − I) = ∅. In the
case I = ∅ (see ‘The Framework’, earlier), criteria 9 and 10 would have to be avoided,
but other criteria involving I should still function in an orderly fashion.)
Related Proposals
The central ideas of the previous section, were first presented in Ritchie (2001), and
have been followed by a number of elaborations (Colton et al. 2001; Pease et al. 2001).
We shall review this subsequent work here, as well as some separate proposals by Koza
et al. (2003), before considering some applications of the ideas to actual systems.
Fine Tuning
Colton et al. (2001) (CPR) provide a small elaboration of the basic framework out-
lined above. Their aim is to define more precisely what would count as fine-tuning
a program — that is, arranging the input knowledge of a program so as to produce
particular output: “A program which has been carefully tailored in order to produce
very specific artefacts cannot be claimed to be a good program on the grounds that it
produces those artefacts.”
The basic framework already allows a crude indication of such a situation, namely
where the inspiring set and the result set are identical, or almost so. Such a scenario
might be rated poorly in creative terms (it would score badly on criterion 10/10a, and,
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a fortiori, on criteria 13 and 14), but it could still be interesting from a research point of
view, since — as noted earlier — it might well demonstrate, and test by implementa-
tion, a mechanistic route from very simple data to interestingly complex output.
CPR refine this approach. They posit a program working with some set K of input
knowledge, and then consider the effect, on the set of high-valued output from the
program, of removing some knowledge K ′; i.e. starting from (K − K ′) instead. The
output items in question would, in the notation of used above, be Vγ,1(R) for some
chosen γ. CPR notate these as VK (where the full knowledge set is used) and V(K−K′)
where K ′ is omitted, and then define:
• K ′ is creatively irrelevant if VK = V(K−K′)
• K ′ is creatively useful if V(K−K′) ⊂ VK
• K ′ is creatively destructive if VK ⊂ V(K−K′)
If I is, as before, the inspiring set, then any output artefacts belonging to I are “rein-
ventions”, and high-valued output artefacts not in I are what CPR call the creative
set. They suggest defining K ′ (the change in input knowledge) as being fine-tuned if
VK − V(K−K′) intersects with I (i.e. includes some reinventions) and does not overlap
with the creative set set produced with input knowledge K (i.e. includes none of the
high-valued new inventions).
CPR also propose a definition of a degree of fine-tuning for a set of knowledge K ′,
in the case where there are at least some high-valued new items in VK − V(K−K′).
ft(K ′) =
|I∩(VK−V(K−K′))|
|(VK−V(K−K′))−I|
(These formulae have been set-theoretically simplified from CPR’s presentation.)
They offer two possible definitions of how fine-tuned a program P is, starting from
an inspiring set I and a knowledge set K:
m1 : Take the union of all knowledge sets K ′ (subsets of K) which are fine-tuned (by
the definition above). Divide the size of this set by the size of K.
m2 : Compute the maximum value of ft(K ′) for all subsets K ′ of K.
CPR observe:
If m1 is greater than 0 or m2 greater than 1, we can claim that P using K
has been fine-tuned to some extent. Ifm1 is 1, P usingK is completely fine-
tuned, in the sense that every item of knowledge in K contributes to some
subset (which non-redundantly contributes to VK) which is fine-tuned. If
m2 is greater than 1, then there is at least one such subset of K which is
used more to replicate known artefacts than to find new ones of value.
CPR also suggest that this perspective allows the comparison of the effects of dif-
ferent pieces of knowledge. If P can be run with K set either to K0 ∪K1 or K0 ∪K2,
then the various fine-tuning measures can be compared for K ′ = K1 and K ′ = K2.
Other Formalisations
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Pease et al. (2001) (hereinafter “PWC”) acknowledge the basic framework in ‘Ev-
idence for creativity’ above, and offer some further formal definitions in the area of
computational creativity. Although the basic framework attempts to be relatively neu-
tral with respect to substantive theories of creativity, building in as few claims as pos-
sible about what gives rise to creativity, PWC are bolder, incorporating some relatively
specific views about creative mechanisms into the constructs they propose. We shall
therefore discuss their ideas in two groups: very general extensions, close to the neu-
tral spirit of the framework, and more specific proposals embodying particular ideas
about creativity.
General Extensions
Subsets of inspiring set. PWC suggest that a fine distinction might usefully be made
between two possible forms of I : IS (all items known to the program designer) and IW
(the items the designer knows have influenced the program design). However, they
do not develop this refinement or incorporate it into the basic framework.
Novelty as complement of typicality. PWC suggest novelty could be formalised as the
fuzzy complement (with respect to the set R of results) of the fuzzy set defined by the
typ mapping, but this is not connected to other proposals.
Quality and Affect. PWC point out that the quality of an artistic item is sometimes re-
lated to the emotional response it evokes. Assuming that a number of human subjects
numerically rate each item for either positive or negative response, PWC offer (with-
out much discussion) 5 possible measures of quality: total of all ratings, average of
all ratings, total of positive ratings, total positive minus total negative, and average of
positive ratings.
More Specific Proposals
Program process: randomness, meta-level and complexity. PWC delve further into the pro-
cess whereby a program produces an artefact (cf. ‘Assumptions’ earlier). They offer
a formula for the “randomness” of an artefact, based on a probability distribution for
particular outputs given particular inputs, and a distance measure between artefacts.
Also, they present 5 possible ways of computing the complexity of an output artefact
(and one for the complexity of a program), mostly based on comparing sets of knowl-
edge items used (cf. ‘Fine tuning’ above). They say these could yield “a useful measure
of novelty”, but do not explain why complexity and novelty are synonymous. They
quote Bundy (1994) as suggesting that the complexity of a concept space might be rel-
evant to creativity, but their measures mainly assess the complexity of a single artefact,
not of a concept space.
PWC suggest that meta-level processing is central to creativity, by proposing to
partition a program’s knowledge into either object or meta, and labelling the degree of
novelty of an output item according to which types of knowledge have been used in
generating it (along with some complexity conditions).
Surprise. PWC offer a formula for the surprise of an artefact, depending on a similarity
measure for events, and a probability distribution over events.
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PWC — Overall
Although PWC’s proposals at first glance appear to be an elaboration of our basic
framework, on closer inspection it is not clear where they would fit into, or alongside,
our formalisation. The basic framework is a first attempt at setting out which factors
might be worth measuring in order to determine whether a program has behaved cre-
atively. It has deliberately been stated conservatively, with as few substantive claims
about creativity as possible while considering how established ideas such as “novelty”
and “quality” might be taken into account. PWC, on the other hand, have taken some
quite specific ideas about creativity, and suggested some preliminary formalisations
for them. They move from treating novelty as a relatively primitive notion (similarity
to existing artefacts, or to existing norms) to loading it with specific ideas about what
constitutes creativity. It is unclear whether there is still a difference, for PWC, between
novelty of an artefact and an artefact being evidence of creativity: novelty seems to
have become the central construct.
As their paper is relatively short, they do not give full supporting arguments for the
decisions they have made in designing their formula, some of which are not completely
obvious. PWC also do not link the various proposals together, so the ideas remain
relatively unconnected.
Koza et al.’s Guidelines
Koza et al. (2003) discuss the extent to which genetic programming has been suc-
cessful as an approach to machine intelligence. They are not primarily concerned with
characterising creativity per se, but the issues which they consider have some overlap
with the concerns here. In contrast to our proposals, Koza et al. are looking for em-
pirical ways which might show that a method (of problem-solving or of discovery) is
successful (rather showing that a program is creative).1
Koza et al. claim that “genetic programming now routinely delivers high-return
human-competitive machine intelligence”, and then say in more detail what they mean
by “routine(ly)”, “high-return”, “human-competitive” (and “machine intelligence”,
though that turns out to be less closely related to the creativity factors that our basic
framework focusses upon).
Koza et al. term a method as routine if it can be applied to a new problem, or a
wide range of problems, with relatively little specialised adjustment. That is, routine
application is an indication of generality.
A method is high-return, on the other hand, if most of what it does is automated,
without a large investment of hand-crafted effort. Koza et al. view this as a ratio
(“artificial-to-intelligence”) which is high if value added by the problem-solving method
is significantly greater than the contribution of the human designers.
A computed result (what we are here calling an “artefact”) is human-competitive if it
meets one or more of eight guidelines which Koza et al. provide. In the terminology we
have been using here, these tests can be viewed as various combinations of quality (e.g.
“The result solves a problem of indisputable difficulty in the field”), and/or H-novelty
1They are also very much focussed on what is sometimes called “knowledge-poor” programming, where
a very general method does not need much hand-crafted domain knowledge to succeed. This focus is un-
derlined by the fact that they group together, for comparison with the method being assessed, “live human
players” and “human-written computer programs”).
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(e.g. “The result is publishable in its own right as a new scientific result, independent
of the fact that the result was mechanically created”) and/or P-novelty (e.g. “The result
is equal to or better than a result which was considered an achievement in its field at
the time it was first discovered”.
It might be possible to form a number of alternative definitions of “creative” for
computer programs by combining some of Koza et al.’s notions (since no single def-
inition in their repertoire corresponds directly with what we are focussing on). For
example a program which achieves human-competitiveness criterion [A] (“The result
was patented as an invention in the past, is an improvement over a patented invention,
or would qualify today as a patentable new invention”) and is also high-return might
be deemed to be creative.
The lack of a need for specialised tuning (as in “routine”) does sound as if it might
affect judgements of creativity, but this intuition is more naturally captured by their
next attribute, “high-return”. That attribute is predicated of a method, but a similar
perspective could be taken on a specific program (as, in fact, Koza et al. do, when they
cite the Deep Blue chess program as an example of a highly successful program with
a disappointingly low “AI ratio”). The desirability of being “high-return” is similar to
the idea that the creativity of a program is less if the program designer has injected a
great deal of hand-crafted knowledge. The question is: how can this be made precise,
or even quantified? The use of the “inspiring set” in our criteria, and Colton et al.’s
definition of “fine-tuning” are very preliminary attempts to get a hold on this idea.
The use of patentability (to show human-competitiveness) is an indicator of both
and quality and novelty. For example, guidelines for US patents2 state that “the claimed
invention as a whole must accomplish a practical application. That is, it must produce
a useful, concrete and tangible result”. This is a clear quality requirement. These guide-
lines also stipulate the need for patent examiners to “conduct a thorough search of the
prior art”, an H-novelty constraint. (Koza et al. broaden this to P-novelty, by allowing
something that was patented in the past to qualify as human-competitive.) The Patent
Act 1977 in the UK3 demands that an idea be “novel”, “involve an inventive step” and
“have industrial application”. An invention has an inventive step “if it is not obvious
to a person skilled in the art”; a further guideline (for biotechnology) glosses this as
situations where known theory would make the outcome obvious.
Patentability (past or present) is quite a high standard for computer programs, in
the current state of the art (although Koza et al. cite some examples of patented inven-
tions by programs). Moreover, it would not, on its own, take into account the contri-
bution by the computer program (as opposed to knowledge or ideas supplied by the
programmer); hence Koza et al.’s use of “high-return”. Also, the focus (at least in the
USA and the UK) on practicality means that patentability is inapplicable in many of the
areas explored by research into computational creativity — the UK’s 1977 Act explicitly
excludes from eligibility for patenting: “a discovery, scientific theory or mathematical
method; a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work or any other aesthetic creation
whatsoever; a scheme, rule or method for performing a mental act, playing a game or
doing busines, or a program for a computer; the presentation of information”.
On the whole, there is a overlap in concerns between Koza’s framework and ours,
2 http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/preognotice/guidelines101 20051026.pdf
3 http://www.patent.gov.uk/patentsact1977.pdf
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but the methodological aims are slightly different.
Applications of the criteria
A Poetry Generator
Gerva´s (2002) analyses one of his poetry-generating programs, WASP (Gerva´s 2000),
using the criteria in ‘Evidence for Creativity’ above. WASP’s inspiring set is a particu-
lar 16th century Spanish classical sonnet, which is taken as establishing the allowable
line lengths (in syllables) and stress patterns. The program then tries to create four-line
stanzas (cuartetos) that are part of the sonnet form. The generation uses a set of line
patterns (enforcing constraints of syllable count and stress patterns, and based on the
part-of-speech sequences occurring in the lines of the sonnet chosen as starting point)
and a set of vocabulary (the words of the original sonnet and “a number of additional
words”, all annotated with syntactic and stress information). Where more than one
word can satisfy the metrical constraints, a random choice is made, so that the process
is non-deterministic and may yield different output on different runs from the same
input.
For testing, 14 different initialisations were used, and 12 runs were made with each.
The 168 resulting items were evaluated by volunteers, who scored each item on syn-
tactic correctness (0-5) and “aesthetic qualities”. The syntactic correctness score and
the number of lines in the stanza (since some may fall short) are combined to give a typ
score, the aesthetic verdict providing the val score. Gerva´s explores the effect of com-
bining syntax and line-count scores with different weights, carrying out assessments
for weightings of 50/50, 30/70 and 70/30.
Gerva´s gives a table of values for the first 14 criteria (i.e. those listed in Ritchie
(2001)), but observes that as none of the inspiring set I appear in the result set R,
criteria 11-14 replicate the values of criteria 1-4, and criteria 9 & 10 give pathological
results (0.00 and division by zero); see Table 1.
Table 1: Applying criteria to WASP data
Crit. Informal meaning 50/50 70/30 30/70
1 Average typicality 0.71 0.67 0.75
2 Typical results/ results 0.54 0.48 0.79
3 Average quality 0.47 0.47 0.47
4 Good results/ results 0.24 0.24 0.24
5 Good typical results/ typical results 0.36 0.34 0.29
6 Good atypical results/ results 0.05 0.08 0.01
7 Good atypical results/ atypical results 0.12 0.16 0.06
8 Good atypical results/ good typical results 0.28 0.52 0.05
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Gerva´s also experiments with varying values for the thresholds α, β (the boundary
typ value between typical and atypical items) and γ (the val value at which an item is
deemed valuable). He considers 5 different possibilities: equal thresholds, being either
high (0.7), medium (0.5) or low (0.3); high α, β and low γ; low α, β and high γ. He
notes that these thresholds affect only criteria 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 (ignoring 9-14 for reasons
stated earlier), and offers Table 2 to summarise the effects (using the 50/50 weighting
for typ calculation).
Table 2: Varying thresholds for WASP evaluation
Crit. High Medium Low α, β high γ low α, β low γhigh
2 0.54 0.88 0.89 0.54 0.89
4 0.24 0.50 0.68 0.68 0.24
5 0.36 0.57 0.77 0.89 0.28
6 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.00
7 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.00
8 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.00
Gerva´s observes that threshold changes can cause large changes in the overall rat-
ing for the criteria, and suggests that perhaps thresholds should be set beforehand
depending on the domain and/or the objectives of the system. He also speculates that
perhaps the typicality scale should have two thresholds: a low one below which arte-
facts are deemed atypical, and a high one above which they are typical; presumably
artefacts in between are neither typical nor atypical. He does not say exactly where
these boundaries should be inserted in the definitions of the criteria, but a plausible
scheme would be to use the higher threshold where α is used, and the lower one for β.
Gerva´s also considers how the Colton et al. measure of “fine-tuning” could be ap-
plied to WASP, and concludes that ft will always have a value of 0, since there are
no re-inventions within the output set. However, he points out that this is because
the fine-tuning measure depends, with excessive simplicity, on a created item being
identical to an inspiring set element (in order for it to count as a re-invention). Gerva´s
rightly observes that where artefacts are extremely similar to elements of I , that should
contribute to a verdict of fine-tuning (see ‘Possible Extensions’).
Pereira et al. (2005) give a resume of the WASP study, and go on to carry out similar
examinations of two other programs, Divago and Dupond.
A Concept Generator
Divago (Pereira 2005) generates new concepts using conceptual blending (Faucon-
nier and Turner 1998), with a genetic algorithm to explore the space. It starts from a
pair of concepts, such as (horse, bird) (from a knowledge base of known concepts), and
tries to find possible blends of these which meet a pre-specified goal (e.g. “something
which flies and is a transport means”). Pereira et al. describe experiments in apply-
ing Divago in three domains: horse-bird combinations, interpretations for noun-noun
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compounds such as “pet fish”, and novel creatures (from a KB of three). In applying
the creativity criteria to the results, they do not use human judgements (as in the WASP
study) to determine ratings for either typ or val. Instead, they devise ways of comput-
ing these automatically from the knowledge sources available to Divago, by making
certain assumptions:
(a) The concepts in the original KB count as I .
(b) Typicality is measured by closeness to I (i.e. the KB defines the norms for arte-
facts), using an edit-distance.
(c) Value is measured by how well the artefact meets the input goal (a factor which
is already used to guide Divago’s search).
Using the settings α = β = γ = 0.5, the results for the original 14 criteria are as given
in Table 3 (here, criterion 10 is recomputed as 10a).
Table 3: Applying criteria to Divago data
Crit. Informal meaning Horse-Bird Noun-Noun Creature
1 Average typicality 0.443 0.543 0.343
2 Typical results/results 0.273 0.563 0.333
3 Average quality 0.504 0.782 1.0
4 Good results/results 0.636 0.781 1.0
5 Good typical results/typical results 1.0 0.778 1.0
6 Good atypical results/results 0.364 0.344 0.667
7 Good atypical results/atypical results 0.5 0.786 1.0
8 Good atypical results/good typical results 0.5 0.786 2.0
9 Results in I/I 0.00 0.036 0.0
10a 1 - (Results in I/Results) 1.0 0.938 1.0
11 Average typicality of new results 0.406 0.513 0.308
12 Average quality of new results 0.483 0.831 1.0
13 Typical new results/new results 0.273 0.500 0.333
14 Good new results/results 0.636 0.781 1.0
Pereira et al. make a number of observations about these findings:
• “The system is better at producing good items than typical ones.”
• As the system is guided in its search by maximising Relevance, any typicality
achieved is an incidental side-effect of this process.
• The apparently better results for the Creatures domain can be explained in terms
of properties of the data and the search spaces involved in the three domains.
A Paraphrase Generator
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Pereira et al. also carried out a similar study with the Dupond system (Mendes
et al. 2004), a program which generates approximate paraphrases of sentences by
replacing selected words with synonyms or hypernyms, in a manner with an element
of randomness. Human subjects were presented with 192 items which consisted of
a human-written sentence and three Dupond-generated variants of it: one using first
hypernyms (H1), one using synonyms with fewer senses (L), and one using synonyms
with more senses (M). The subjects classified the generated sentences relative to the
human source sentence, on 3-point scales, for being more original (O), having the same
meaning (S), being more comprehensible (U).
As in the Divago study above, typicality was taken to be the opposite of originality
(the O ratings). Value was measured in two alternative ways: either the S rating or the
U rating.
Once again, the parameters α, β, γ were all set to 0.5, in the absence of any prin-
cipled reason for any other values. Full criteria scores with val = S are provided,
but only for criteria 3–8 for val = U ; all these are as in Table 4, with the U values in
brackets.
Table 4: Applying criteria to Dupond data
Crit. Informal meaning H1 L M
1 Average typicality 0.559 0.49 0.554
2 Typical R/R 0.75 0.475 0.65
3 Average quality 0.295(0.146) 0.495 (0.238) 0.426 (0.294)
4 Good R/R 0.1(0) 0.5(0.05) 0.4 (0.025)
5 Good typical R/typical R 0.1(0) 0.474 (0.053) 0.462(0.038)
6 Good atypical R/R 0.025(0) 0.3 (0.025) 0.125 (0)
7 Good atypical R/atypical R 0.091(0) 0.545(0.045) 0.333(0)
8 Good atypical R/good typical R 0.333(DIV BY 0) 1.333(1.0) 0.417(0)
9 Results in I/I 0.015 0.015 0.026
10a 1 - (Results in I/Results) 0.985 0.985 0.975
11 Average typicality of new R 0.559 0.49 0.554
12 Average quality of new R 0.295 0.495 0.426
13 Typical new R/new R 0.75 0.475 0.65
14 Good new R/R 0.1 0.5 0.4
Pereira et al.’s Summing Up
Pereira et al. rightly observe that it is not realistic to compare scores achieved by
their different systems, as the applications are so different, although they believe that
more general claims can be made such as “Divago tends to be more creative than
Dupond in a variety of criteria”, and that one can argue that a particular approach
(e.g. genetic algorithms) leads to more creativity. Even these conclusions may be over-
interpretation of the findings, given the degree of arbitrariness in the choice of con-
stants (α, γ) (which Pereira et al. remark on) and the varying interpretations of notions
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such as “typicality” and “quality”. As Pereira et al. comment, care is needing in decid-
ing how to assess these basic factors.
They also remark that the criteria involve typicality and value rather than novelty
and usefulness, conceding that value and usefulness might be equated but that typ-
icality and novelty are opposites. This perspective could be contested. The criteria
do not include novelty as a primitive construct, but do address novelty in terms of the
comparison with the inspiring set and also the notion of atypicality; that is, novelty is
decomposed into other, more basic, relations.
These authors conclude that although the criteria represent “consensual properties”
and “principles generally accepted”, the problem lies in the instantiation of the criteria
and the lack of canonical problems.
A Melody Generator
Haenen and Rauchas (2006) describe a program which generates melodies, with
some assessment using our criteria (as well as some statistical comparisons of human
judgements about the computer output). Each output was generated using the char-
acteristics of exactly one famous melody. Human judges were asked to rate generated
melodies on two scales: typicality (1 to 3) and quality (1 to 5). Typicality was defined
as being similarity to other melodies in a set made up of the 21 “inspiring” items (fa-
mous melodies), the 21 generated melodies, and 6 randomly generated melodies. To
evaluate the formulae for the criteria, α (typicality threshold) was set to 2/3, equivalent
to the central score (“somewhat typical”), and two values of γ (quality threshold) were
explored: 3/5 (the central score, “indistinct melody, not very interesting”) and 3.87/5
(where 3.87 was the average rating given by the judges to human-composed melodies).
Haenen and Rauchas report that 18 of 21 artefacts exceeded the α value, 16 exceeded
γ = 0.667 and 8 exceeded γ = 0.773, and remark that “no results from the inspiring set
appeared in the result set”; they therefore do not discuss criteria 9 to 14 in detail (cf.
the WASP study, above). (I was in effect a different singleton for each generated arte-
fact.) Haenen and Rauchas, following the practice of Gerva´s and Pereira et al., list the
values for the criteria (evaluated for the set of 21 generated artefacts), for their values
of α and γ. They comment on the proportion exceeding the thresholds (cf. criteria 2,
4), and the fact that one piece was rated as atypical but of good quality (cf. criteria 6, 7,
8). From the latter artefact, they conclude that the program “is able to produce creative
melodies”.
Haenen and Rauchas, in their short paper, do not discuss their use of the criteria
at length (and their statistical measures of the human judgement data may be more
illuminating), leaving some questions. Were there any implicit inspiring items in the
way that the program mechanisms were devised? Is similarity to the set of items used
in the study (inputs and outputs) a suitable yardstick of typicality? What, if anything,
can be inferred from the 8 criteria values listed for these results?
Discussion
Use of the Criteria
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Probably the most central issue arising from the applications described in the pre-
vious section is the intended usage of the criteria. Those who have applied them to
particular systems, as reviewed above, have treated all the 14 original criteria as hav-
ing equal status, and as providing a 14-point checklist or yardstick which will provide
a quantitative profile of the creativity level of the program. This is not how they were
intended. The aim of the original presentation of the criteria (Ritchie 2001) was to
show how to make precise some factors which are of interest when assessing a poten-
tially creative program, in order to illustrate a range of possibilities which would-be
assessors of programs could select from, add to, or modify in a systematic way. There
is no consensus on what counts as creative, particularly when considering programs.
A framework such as the one outlined here allows for multiple definitions of creativity
(or definitions of different styles or levels of creativity). As mentioned in ‘Assump-
tions’, for a computer to manage even to produce “normal” or “typical” exemplars of
a genre (thus scoring well on criteria 1 and 2) is a worthwhile task, but it is a different
level of achievement from producing highly-valued but untypical artefacts (criteria 6,
7, 8). This emphasises that the set of criteria listed here should be considered as a
repertoire from which one might draw. The fact that (as observed in Ritchie (2001))
different criteria seem to lead in different directions with respect to the underlying in-
tuition about creativity is not a problem. Rather, one can define different variants by
suitable choices and combinations of criteria.
More formally, the various parameters α, β, γ, θ in the above definitions are a source
of flexibility. Also, whatever criteria are formally defined (those given above being an
illustrative set) can be used selectively, or put into different logical combinations, or
various weights could be attached to them (so that the overall creativity rating for a
program’s behaviour could then be the weighted sum of the results of specified crite-
ria).
If we could settle on a set of criteria such as those listed in ‘Evidence for Creativity’
above, then we could formally define a creativity judgement system as being a set of
values for the various parameters involved (α, β, . . .). However, it is premature to
frame such a definition. We need to refine our ideas about suitable criteria (and suitable
parameters) before attempting standardisation in this way.
As already remarked, the criteria do not all pull in the same direction, as some
reward typicality and others give high scores to atypicality. Criteria 1 and 2 are not
even real evidence of creativity (nor originality, novel, surprise or quality), but mere
baseline measures to see if the program is at least succeeding at its core task of creating
the right kind of artefact. Similarly, criteria 9 merely checks whether the program can
at least replicate the kind of artefacts on which it is based. Criteria 3 and 4 reward
value (quality) without regard for typicality, and so might be deemed rather blunt
probes. Criterion 5 looks for items which are both typical and good, and so could
be said to reflect Boden’s “exploratory” creativity (although Boden characterises this,
informally, in terms of a process — exploration — rather than in terms of a resulting
characteristic — typicality). Criteria 6,7 and 8 focus on untypical but good, which
(with the same caveat) might correspond to Boden’s “transformational” creativity. All
of 1 to 7 take no account of past artefacts (particularly, the inspiring set) except insofar
as this is encoded into the notion of typicality. Criterion 10/10a looks for avoidance
of the inspiring set, which in itself is not very interesting, if the resulting artefacts
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have poor typicality or quality ratings; this is a clear example of a criterion which
might be a helpful component of a profile of the behaviour of the program, but in
isolation gives no evidence of interesting creativity. Criteria 11 to 18 then concentrate
on the novel results (outside the inspiring set), but again there are different emphases
available: 11, 13, 15, searching for typicality alone (i.e. successful but unadventurous
creation), with 12, 14, and 16 testing quality without regard for typicality, 17 seeking
the conjunction, and 18 demanding what is sometimes viewed as the most creative
combination: novelty (both w.r.t. I and as low typicality) and high quality. This shows
that not all these criteria are equally demanding. Application of the criteria might be
made more subtle by separating them into subsets which represent different facets of
program behaviour:
Basic success: 1, 2, 9
Unrestrained quality: 3,4
Conventional skill: 5
Unconventional skill: 6,7,8a
Avoiding replication: 10a
Basic success, avoiding replication: 11,13,15
Unrestrained quality, avoiding replication: 12,14,16
Conventional skill, avoiding replication: 17
Unconventional skill, avoiding replication: 18
It is interesting to note that the authors who have made use of the criteria do not
use them as boolean conditions to be either satisfied or not, despite the fact that they
were originally stated in this way. Since the 14 criteria were stated as quantities to be
compared with θ, the later writers have simply cited these quantities to give some idea
of the behaviour of the program. This avoids the need to make an arbitrary choice
for the threshold θ, and allows a subtler statement of the extent to which a program is
meeting a criterion. This may be a better way to regard the “criteria”: as a vector of
values, all (in the revised set of 18) in [0,1], which constitute a profile of the program’s
behaviour.
The Meaning of the Criteria
Another notable aspect of the case studies surveyed in ‘Applications of the Criteria’
above is that some of these researchers have used the formulae of the original crite-
ria while making slight changes to the definitions of the primitive constructs, which
means that they are altering the meanings of the criteria.
In the Divago study, typicality (typ) is measured as closeness to I , which means
that what were two separate factors in the original criteria are now very closely re-
lated, both in effect measuring avoidance of replication, instead of having typ indicate
success at constructing exemplars of some independently defined genre of artefact.
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The Dupond study also tinkers with the typ rating, by setting it to embody the oppo-
site of a subjective judgement of being more original than the source sentence. This
may well have been a interesting factor to measure, but again it is a different concept
from a measurement of the extent to which an artefact falls within some target class of
artefacts. Haenen and Rauchas treat typicality as similarity to the complete set of items
involved in their study, including randomly generated artefacts. It is not clear that this
is the same intuitive notion as “typical example of the intended artefact class”, and also
it means that similarity to the inspiring set (something which does not show up explic-
itly in their use of the criteria) becomes a component of typicality, as in the Divago
study. (Haenen and Rauchas also asked their human judges to guess which melodies
were human-written and which computer-generated. This could have been used to
give a computer piece a typ value equal to the proportion of judges who thought it to
be human-written, thereby sticking closer to the original idea of human-judged con-
formity to cultural norms.)
Quality (val) is defined in the Divago study as closeness of fit to the program’s
input goal, a more subtle change of emphasis. While this does not alter the formal
meaning of the criteria — they were deliberately general and unconstrained about how
value ratings might be arrived at — it does shift the perspective by which we view the
Divago program. It is no longer aiming for some hazy, subjectively defined notion
of a “good” artefact (as generators of melodies, stories, jokes, poems, pictures, etc.
usually do — see ‘Assumptions’), it is now searching in a space where success can be
completely defined algorithmically. It is more like a generator of class timetables or
of chip designs, where the space may be very large, but complete success is not only
possible but can be unambiguously detected if it occurs. It is not completely obvious
whether these elaborate criteria are appropriate in this simpler situation.
The point is not that any of these modifications are wrong, or that inappropriate
factors have been considered. Rather, the problem is that the authors have changed
the meaning of the formulae while retaining the notation, without emphasising the
fact that they are focussing on slightly different factors. A cleaner approach would
have been to define different formulae or criteria, presenting a rationale for each one,
so that the set of attributes being measured would be more explicit. Formal criteria
like this offer a means of stating a particular view of what is interesting to measure,
but it is important to argue out the case for looking at particular properties, rather
than presenting the changes as mere minor amendments to formal definitions which
were originally justified on other grounds. Such redefinitions disguise what is being
measured.
Parameter Values
The question of how to determine the various thresholds α, β, γ, θ is far from triv-
ial. (The role of θ could be eliminated, if, as suggested earlier, we treat the criteria
not as truth-valued conditions, but formulae providing values in [0,1].) One possibil-
ity (following the way that Haenen and Rauchas (2006) chose a value for γ) is to use
values determined by similar assessments of human-created artefacts. That is, if we
assume that typ and val correspond to subjective judgements, by human subjects, of
the qualities of artefacts, we could compute values such as the mean, standard devi-
ation, maximum, and minimum for the judgements of human generated artefacts, and
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then use these in some way to define the thresholds for the assessment of computer
artefacts.
Possible extensions
The ideas presented here are just a first step in building up a methodology for assess-
ing potentially creative programs. There are a number of ways in which they could
perhaps be elaborated to capture more subtle aspects of creative processing.
Similarity
One important weakness of the framework (raised by Ritchie (2001), Pease et al.
(2001), Pereira et al. (2005)), is that it does not handle the notion of similarity very
cleanly. In particular, the present criteria compare the result set with the inspiring
set only in terms of overlap in membership, but make no allowance for the idea that
output items could vary in the extent to which they are similar to those in the inspiring
set (as commented by Gerva´s, above). If we could define some form of distance metric
between basic items, then a more subtle approach would be possible.
The question of similarity/distance measures is a vast topic which it is not feasible
to explore here, but it is worth making one methodological point. Since our whole
approach is based upon observing and measuring empirical aspects of generating pro-
grams, with as little theorising as possible about how creativity happens, any simi-
larity measure used as part of the criteria should be based on observable properties
of generated artefacts. These could come, for example, from ratings given by human
subjects, either from direct judgements of similarity between artefacts, or indirectly
via ratings on a set of scales which could be combined in some way to compute sim-
ilarity/distance. Alternatively, a similarity measure could be based on a theoretical
model of the domain in question, but it would be important to ensure that the similar-
ity between artefacts could be determined objectively without prejudging questions of
novelty or creativity.
Regardless of how the similarity measure is defined, if we have a measure for the
distance between any two items, it should be possible to devise a suitable definition
of the distance of an item from a set (such as the inspiring set), or even the overall
distance of one set of items (e.g. the results) from another set (e.g. the inspiring set).
Then we could either rephrase those criteria which mention I to be more general and
distance-based, or it might be clearer to devise additional distance-based criteria.
For example, suppose that our distance function has (in some way) allowed the
definition, for any set S of basic items, of:
Nδ(S) : the δ-neighbourhood of S, being the set of all items (including
members of S) which lie within distance δ of the set S.
Then we can define counterparts of criteria 9 and 10/10a by replacing I∩RwithNδ(I)∩
R, and counterparts of 11 to 18 by replacing R − I with R − Nδ(I) for some suitable
value of δ. (These could be criteria 9b, 10b, 11b, etc.)
There is another way in which a distance measure could throw light on aspects
of creativity. If we have a way of locating artefacts within a multi-dimensional space
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(based either on similarity ratings or on assignment of properties to artefacts), then we
can consider the extent to which a program’s output is clustered. If the generated items
are all very similar to each other, and so are restricted to a narrow part of the available
space, that would be a further interesting factor in giving a “profile” of the performance
of the program (if we adopt the perspective mentioned earlier, that the criteria could
be seen as characterising the behaviour of the program). Whether narrow clustering
indicates greater creativity than wide exploration does is a question for debate. The
suggestion by Pereira et al. (2005) (see ‘Possible Extensions’ below) that repetition is
a sign of lower creativity could be generalised to a proposal that near-repetition (as
measured by similarity) is a symptom of less creativity.
The Contribution of the Designer
It would be interesting to develop further the issue mentioned in ‘The Framework’
above: how does the program come into being, and what is its exact relationship to
the inspiring set? The question of making the inspiring set concrete and measurable
has been tackled in some specific ways in the studies reported in ‘Applications of the
Criteria’, usually by focussing on the items in some knowledge base which drives the
creative process. The way in which the program is designed, and how input data are
chosen, are still relatively uncharted.
Ritchie (2001) sketches a formalisation of some of the relevant stages: the selection
of the inspiring set I from B, taking into account typ and val; the devising of both an
algorithm for the program, and a tuple of input parameter domains which show what
arguments the program takes; the initialisation of parameter values for a particular
run of a program. All of these could be appraised from a creativity point of view. At
present, we offer no formal criteria for these subprocesses, but this appears to be an
area where our style of analysis could be applied.
It could be argued that this relaxes the strict assumption that we should not, when
assessing creativity, be examining how the creation occurred. However, the extension
sketched here would still not delve into the internal workings of the program; rather,
it would aim to clarify the role of the program designer, and the extent to which pre-
programmed knowledge might be biasing the outcomes. This is the question that Koza
et al. describe as the “artificial-to-intelligence” ratio or Colton et al. raise as “fine-
tuning”.
A further, more advanced scenario is the situation where a user (maybe even the
program’s designer) intervenes during the running of the program, using knowledge
of what the program has already done in order to guide it in particular directions (as
in Lenat (1976)). Such interventions are also relevant to the question of the extent of
the program’s own creativity. However, this is much more difficult to formalise and
assess. It would need some explicit model of the computation process which allowed
the idea of knowledge being added at intermediate stages, while not (to conform to
our core assumptions) taking undue account of the steps made within the program.
This is beyond the current framework.
Self-Rating of Output
Boden (1992: p.83) suggests that one facet of human creativity is an ability to recog-
nise the worth of a created entity. At a very crude level, we could allow for a generating
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program which assigns a rating to each item that it produces, indicating either the typ-
icality or value (or both) that the program allocates to that item. Some programs (e.g.
AM (Lenat 1979)) include a mechanism of this sort. It should be feasible to devise
further formal definitions (in addition to those in ‘Evidence of Creativity’) which make
use of this form of data. These additional criteria should then capture the intuitive
idea that the program’s rating of its own output ought (if the program is to be deemed
creative) to have a high correlation with corresponding external ratings (gleaned, for
example, from human judgements).
Multiple Runs
Pereira et al. criticise the criteria for describing a single set of program results, rather
than behaviour over time as a number of runs occur. They suggest that if a system re-
peats itself in later runs, that is a sign of less creativity. There are three logically separate
issues here: repetition, non-determinism, and input parameters.
The issue of repetition arises even without admitting multiple runs. We have as-
sumed throughout our discussions that the output R is a set of results. If we generalise
R to be a bag, then we can consider matters such as repetitions. If we define R to be a
sequence, we can also consider the order in which artefacts are produced, although it is
less obvious what the implications for creativity judgements might be.
In the case of multiple program runs, if the program retains information from one
run to the next (via a persistent store of some sort), then the sequence of runs may be
regarded as instalments of one run, with results accumulating. In that case, repetition
could be handled much as in the single-run case, if we merge or concatenate the out-
put from the runs. On the other hand, if the program starts completely afresh each
time, then the question is whether the program behaves identically (or similarly) on
each run. If the program is sufficiently non-deterministic that it may produce different
results on successive runs, then a comparison could made between the different result-
sets for similarity, if we wished to explore Pereira et al.’s intuition that variety is more
creative.
The third consideration here is the effect of input parameters. We have largely
glossed over the idea that a program is affected by parameters (apart from “fine-
tuning”). If successive runs of a program are carried out with different parameters,
then this allows a study of the effects of these parameters on the output.
Random Generation
Since the formalisation above says little about how artefacts are generated, there is
a sense in which it does not exclude the random production of basic items. The level of
abstraction of the framework means that it has no way to distinguish random genera-
tion from any other approach. Although random generation is not a hugely interesting
case from an AI point of view, it might, in certain discussions, be an interesting base-
line for comparison purposes. To allow explicit formal comparisons, we would need a
more detailed definition of the available space of basic items and how this space could
be randomly explored. One way to do that might be to decompose the notion of “basic
item” so as to make explicit the internal structure of an item (e.g. as an array of pixels,
or as a sequence of words). The other requirement would be a suitable definition of
“random combination of atomic parts”.
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This might connect to the ideas of Wiggins (2006a), where a formalisation is given
of the notion of a potentially creative program exploring a space of concepts. Some ex-
ploration strategies could be classed as “random”, or suitable baselines in some other
sense. If these were specified in sufficient detail to implement, or at least to predict
their outcomes, then the result set of such a benchmark strategy could be compared
with the result set of a supposedly creative program, in terms of typicality and value.
Statistical tests could be applied to determine how distinct these sets of ratings were.
Conclusion
We have proposed an approach to the assessment of creativity (in programs) in which
relevant factors (such as the quality of produced artefacts) are made explicit and are
defined precisely. This allows the definition of a number of formulae relating these
factors, in ways which should show how successful the program has been at certain
aspects of the creative endeavour. ‘Possible Extensions’ lists just some of the ways in
which they could be improved. As noted in ‘Use of the Criteria’, we do not see this
list of criteria as forming a definite standard of creativity. Instead, we offer it as an
initial draft of a set of possible measures to be applied to a program, to illuminate
what it is and is not achieving. We hope that this framework will stimulate discussion
of what exactly should be considered when debating the issue of creativity, and may
contribute, in the longer term, to a sounder basis for attributing creativity to programs.
The usefulness of some of the criteria, or the correctness of the particular formal-
isation, may be disputed, but anyone who believes that questions about the creative
behaviour of programs are to be tested empirically should put forward some compa-
rably detailed ways in which creativity could be assessed.
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